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Abstract
This paper develops the link between poverty and inequality by focussing
on a class of poverty indices (some of them well-known) which aggregate
normative concerns for absolute and relative deprivation. The indices are
distinguished by a parameter that captures the ethical sensitivity of poverty
measurement to “exclusion” or “relative-deprivation” aversion. We also
show how the indices can be readily used to predict the impact of growth on
poverty. An illustration using LIS data finds that the United States show
more relative deprivation than Denmark and Belgium whatever the per-
centiles considered, but that overall deprivation comparisons of the four
countries considered will generally necessarily depend on the intensity of the
ethical concern for relative deprivation. The impact of growth on poverty is
also seen to depend on the presence of and on the attention granted to con-
cerns over relative deprivation.
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1 Introduction
Since the work of Sen (1976), taking into account inequality among the
poor, and not solely the incidence or average intensity of poverty, has be-
come common scientific practice and has generated a considerable literature
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. Alongside this has grown a belief among several researchers and policy
analysts that concerns of relativity are also important in assessing poverty
lines. In the words of Townsend (1979), a well-known proponent of that
relativist view:
“Individuals, families and groups in the population can be said to be in
poverty when they lack the resources to obtain the type of diet, participate in
the activities and have the living conditions and amenities which are custom-
ary, or are at least widely encouraged or approved, in the societies to which
they belong. Their resources are so seriously below those commanded by the
average individual or family that they are, in effect, excluded from ordinary
living patterns, customs and activities.” (p.31)
The link between poverty and relative exclusion from society also tran-
spires from the official use of the concept of social exclusion in the European
Commission, where it is defined “in relation to the social rights of citizens
(...) to participation in the major social and occupational opportunities of
the society.” (Room (1992), p.14) On his part, Sen believes that comparing
poverty across distributions may involve “different standards of minimum
necessities” (1981, p.21) and “that absolute deprivation in terms of a per-
son’s capabilities relates to relative deprivation in terms of commodities,
incomes and resources” (1984, p.326). This view is somewhat supported by
the large number of cross-country comparisons using proportions of median
or mean incomes as poverty lines.
Another link between poverty and relativity is the frequent normalisa-
tion of poverty indices by possibly different poverty lines (see, for instance,
Foster et al. (1984)), which typically leads to “relative poverty indices” as
defined in Blackorby and Donaldson (1980). Foster and Shorrocks (1988),
Foster and Sen (1997) and Davidson and Duclos (2000) show how such
normalisation links relative poverty and relative inequality comparisons. Fi-
nally, having identified the poor and measured the respective intensity of
their poverty, individual poverty is usually aggregated into global poverty
indices, and “in the ’aggregation’ exercise the magnitudes of absolute depri-
1See e.g., Takayama (1979), Kakwani (1980), Clark, Hemming and Ulph (1981), Atkinson
(1987) and Foster et al. (1984) for such work, and Foster (1984), Chakravarty (1990), Foster and
Sen (1997) and Zheng (1997), among others, for a review of different aspects of the social welfare,
poverty, and inequality literatures.
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vation may have to be supplemented by considerations of relative depriva-
tion” (Sen (1981),p.32).
Among all these links between poverty, inequality and exclusion, it is on
the one between poverty and relative deprivation in the latter “aggregation
exercise” that we wish to focus particularly in this paper2. We will do this by
developing a class of poverty indices which combine concerns of absolute
deprivation and of relative deprivation. Absolute deprivation is undoubtedly
“an irreducible core (...) in our idea of poverty, which translates reports of
starvation, malnutrition and visible hardship onto a diagnosis of poverty”
(Sen (1981), p.17). Although sometimes neglected by economists, relative
deprivation has been linked to “definable and measurable social and psycho-
logical reactions, such as different types of alienation” (Durant and Christian
(1990), p.210) by social psychologists and to social protests, discrimination,
feelings of injustice and subjective ill-being (Olson (1986)). It has also been
used to interpret measures of inequality and income redistribution (see for
instance Yitzhaki (1979) and Duclos (2000)).
The class of poverty indices we consider in this paper is a generalisation
of the Sen(1976)-Thon(1979)- Chakravarty(1983)-Shorrocks(1995) indices
of poverty. The indices S(v) depend upon an ethical parameter v which
captures the sensitivity of poverty measurement to “exclusion” or “relative-
deprivation” aversion. The greater the value of v, the greater the weight
assigned to relative deprivation as against absolute deprivation in measuring
and comparing poverty.
The next section sets up the basic definitions and shows the link between
generalised Gini indices and relative deprivation, upon which our subse-
quent work draws. Section 2 then shows how our class of poverty indices
can be understood as a weighted sum of absolute and relative deprivation.
It further points to the indices’ useful and simple graphical interpretation as
weighted areas underneath cumulative poverty gap (CPG) curves, and indi-
cates how they can be used to assess the impact of growth on poverty and
for decomposition analyses. Section 2 also compares the properties of the
S(v) indices with those of additive poverty indices (most saliently, with the
popular class of FGT indices (Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984))).
Section 3 illustrates some of the results using Luxembourg Income Study
data drawn from 4 countries. For a reasonable common poverty line, we find
2For this aggregative exercise, an absolute or a relative poverty line can be equally well be used.
For what follows, however, we assume this line to be the same for the measurement of absolute
and relative deprivation. The aggregation exercise and the results of the paper could, however, be
extended to the use of different poverty lines for the measurement and the aggregation of absolute
and relative deprivation.
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that, whatever the percentiles considered, the United States have more rela-
tive deprivation than Denmark and Belgium, but that the relative deprivation
curve for Italy crosses that of the three other countries. Moreover, for all
but one of the six possible country comparisons, it is not possible to make
unambiguous robust poverty orderings based on CPG curves. Since abso-
lute deprivation and mean poverty are very similar in the four countries, we
thus find that unambiguous poverty comparisons would inevitably depend
on the importance granted to concerns over relative deprivation. The im-
pact of growth on poverty is also seen to depend on the presence of and on
concerns for relative deprivation: in pairwise comparisons, poverty is least
responsive to growth in the USA and in Denmark, which is also where rela-
tive deprivation is the greatest. The last section concludes our paper.
2 Inequality and relative deprivation
Consider the cumulative distribution of income F with support contained in
the nonnegative real line. Let a poverty line be denoted by z, and define
the headcount index as H = F (z). Denote by y(p) the quantile function
associated to F . y(p) is formally defined as y(p) = inffs  0jF (s)  pg
for p 2 [0; 1]. For a continuous and strictly increasing distribution, y(p) is
simply F 1(p) and can be thought of as the income of the individual whose
rank (or percentile) is p. Let y(p) be the income y(p) when censored at z,
with y(p) = min(y(p); z), and denote the poverty gap of an individual at
rank p by g(p) = (z   y(p)). Note therefore that g(p) = 0 for p  H . 3
The next most popular poverty index after the headcount is traditionally
denoted by HI , the average poverty gap in the population:
HI =
Z
1
0
g(p)dp: (1)
3Note here that we have not normalised poverty gaps by the poverty line. This normalisation
would make no substantial difference whenever the poverty lines are the same across all distri-
butions being compared. The normalisation will in fact be desirable if poverty lines are designed
to act as price indices in order to transform nominal incomes into real incomes (making living
standards comparable across distributions with different prices). It is not clear, however, that such
a normalsation is an appropriate procedure when poverty lines differ for reasons other than dif-
ferences in prices (see, e.g., Atkinson (1991) and Davidson and Duclos (2000)). For instance,
it might be that differences in climatic conditions or normative judgements set a higher poverty
line in real terms in some distributions than in others. Normalising poverty gaps by the respective
poverty lines would then push the analysis away from comparing absolute deprivation towards
comparing deprivation and poverty gaps as a proportion of different poverty lines, a feature which
could potentially lead to invalid rankings of well-being and deprivation across the distributions.
3
Hence, if perfect targetting of the poor were possible, HI would give
the per capita expenditures which the state would need to spend in order to
eradicate poverty completely. Clearly, and as we will discuss more later, HI
does not give any ethical or normative weight to inequality in the distribution
of the poverty gaps.
Let the cumulative poverty gap (CPG) curve be defined as:
G(p) =
Z
p
0
g(s)ds: (2)
This curve was introduced by Jenkins and Lambert (1997), who called
it a "TIP" curve, and subsequently by Shorrocks (1998), who labelled it a
"Poverty Profile" curve (see also on this the work by Spencer and Fisher
(1992)). It is clear from (2) that :
dG(p)
dp
= g(p): (3)
By definition, we have that G(0) = 0 and G(p) = HI for p  H . G(p)
thus becomes saturated at p = H . G(p)=p is the average poverty gap of
the 100  p% poorest members of the population. G(H)=H is the average
poverty gap of the poor, often defined in the literature (see Sen (1976)) as
I . As we shall see, the curvature of the CPG curve also shows the extent of
inequality in the distribution of the poverty gaps.
The CPG curve is continuous, non-decreasing and concave in p, as we
can see on Figure 1, where CPG curves G
A
(p) and G
B
(p) have been drawn
for two hypothetical distributions, A and B. As can be seen on the Figure,
A has everywhere a greater cumulative poverty gap whatever the percentage
of the poorest part of the population considered. A has also more inequality
among its poor than B (for which all poor have the same incomes, as can be
seen from the initial straight line segment). A has nevertheless a lower head-
count than B. In determining which of A or B has more poverty, there may
therefore exist a trade-off between the number of the poor (the “incidence”
of poverty H), the overall average poverty gap (the average “intensity”, HI),
and the inequality in poverty (the curvature of G(p)).
The class of poverty indices S(v) on which we will focus in this paper
will all indicate that poverty is greater in A than in B (although the head-
count index clearly would not). This is because G
A
(p) is everywhere greater
than G
B
(p). This ordering of poverty in terms of CPG curves is in fact valid
for a broader class of poverty indices than S(v), as shown in Jenkins and
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Lambert (1997) and in Shorrocks (1998). Let  be the class of poverty in-
dices  that are replication invariant, increasing and Schur-convex in g(p).
Then,
G
A
(p)  G
B
(p)8p 2 [0; 1] if and only if 
A
 
B
8 2 : (4)
A useful tool for capturing the inequality in the distribution of poverty
gaps is the Lorenz curve of the distribution of censored incomes, defined as
L(p) =
1

R
p
0
y(s)ds.  is the mean of the distribution of censored incomes;
with equation (1) and g(p) = z   y(p), this gives HI = z   . This allows
a decomposition of the CPG curve into components due to the mean and to
the inequality of poverty gaps:
G(p) =
Z
p
0
z   y(s)ds (5)
= p (z   ) +  (p  L(p)) (6)
= p HI
| {z }
A
+ (p  L(p))
| {z }
B
(7)
where
A  poverty of the 100  p% poorest if aggregate poverty HI were equally
distributed across the population
B  excess poverty for the 100  p% poorest due to the inequality in the
distribution of aggregate poverty.
Hence, the value of G(p) can be split in two parts, mean deprivation
(A) and “excess” deprivation due to inequality of poverty (B), as shown in
Figure 2. As Figure 2 also suggests, we will see later that this decomposition
gives rise respectively to absolute and relative deprivation.
To capture inequality of poverty in an aggregate index, first recall that
the Gini index of inequality is given by4:
I = 2
Z
1
0
(p  L(p))dp: (8)
The Gini index is thus the average distance between population shares and
income shares of all possible proportions (between 0 and 1) of the poorer
in a population. A well-known single-parameter generalisation of the Gini
4This and subsequent definitions are given implicitly for distributions of censored incomes, but
they can clearly apply to any distribution of living standards.
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(or “s-Gini” 5) is obtained by applying the normative weights k(p; v) =
v(v   1)(1  p)
v 2
, for v  1, to the distance p  L(p) between the line of
perfect equality and the Lorenz curve:
I(v) =
Z
1
0
(p  L(p))k(p; v)dp: (9)
For v = 1, no weight is attached to inequality, and I(1) = 0. For 1 < v < 2,
k(p; v) increases with p, and thus greater weight is attributed to the distance
p   L(p) at larger proportions of the population. For v = 2, the weight is
equal to 2 everywhere, and I(2) is thus the standard Gini coefficient defined
in (8). For v > 2, the weight given to the distance p  L(p) between popu-
lation share and income share decreases with p, and more and more rapidly
so as v rises. Note that k(p; v) (for integers v > 1) can be interpreted as
the probability that an individual with rank p in the population finds himself
the poorest among v   1 individuals randomly selected from the population
(see, e.g., Muliere and Scarsini (1989), Lambert (1993) and Duclos (2000)).
Now define :
!(p; v) =
Z
1
p
k(s; v)ds = v(1  p)
v 1
: (10)
By integration by parts, we can show that the index I(v) in (9) equals6
I(v) =
Z
1
0
!(p; v)
  y(p)

dp (11)
It is well-known that the standard Gini coefficient can be understood as
an index of relative deprivation (Sen (1973), Yitzhaki (1979) and Hey and
Lambert (1980)). Duclos (2000) also shows a similar result for the s-Gini.
To see this, assume that an individual i with rank p
i
feels the following
relative deprivation Æ(p
i
; p
j
) when he compares himself to an individual j
with rank p
j
:
5See Kakwani (1980), Donaldson and Weymark (1980, 1983) and Yitzhaki (1983).
6For expositional simplicity, the derivation of equations (11), (14) and (15) is shown in the
appendix. For ease of reference, also note that in a discrete setting with a finite population of n
individuals, the weight on an individual with rank j; j = 1; :::; n; (when individuals are sorted in
increasing values of incomes) equals (see Donaldson and Weymark (1980)):
!(j=n; v) =
1
n
v
 
(n  j + 1)
v
  (n  j)
v

:
6
Æ(p
i
; p
j
) =
(
y(p
j
)  y(p
i
) if p
j
> p
i
0 otherwise. (12)
This formulation has often been justified by reference to the classical defini-
tion of relative deprivation found in Runciman (1966, p.10): “The magnitude
of a relative deprivation is the extent of the difference between the desired
situation [e.g., the income of the richer] and that of the person desiring it”.
Note again here that we use censored income instead of just income.
The expected relative deprivation of individual i with respect to the
whole population of j’s is then given by
c(p
i
) =
Z
1
0
Æ(p
i
; p)dp: (13)
Combining (12) and (13) yields:
c(p
i
) = (1  L(p
i
))  (1  p
i
)y(p
i
): (14)
We now wish to aggregate each individual’s relative deprivation into an
overall index. To do this, we may take an ethically weighted mean of c(p),
with weights equal to k(p; v). We can then show that:
I(v) =
1
v
Z
1
0
c(p)k(p; v)dp: (15)
The standard Gini coefficient is thus obtained as a mean-normalised ex-
pected relative deprivation in the population :
G(2) =
1
2
Z
1
0
c(p)dp: (16)
More generally, for integers v > 1, the s-Gini I(v) is the expected relative
deprivation of the individual who finds himself the most deprived out of a
group of v   1 individuals randomly drawn from a population. Thus, the
greater the value of v, the more weight is given to the relative deprivation of
the poorer (see Duclos (2000) for more on this).
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3 A Class of Poverty Indices
3.1 Poverty and Deprivation
Now define a single-parameter index of poverty S(v) (along the lines of the
I(v) index7) as a weighted area underneath the CPG curve G(p) :
S(v) =
Z
1
0
k(p; v)G(p)dp: (17)
By integration by parts, proceeding as for (11), we can show that S(v) can
also be expressed as a weighted sum of poverty gaps, with the weights equal
to !(p; v) :
S(v) =
Z
1
0
!(p; v)g(p)dp: (18)
(18) can be understood as a special case of a more general class of linear
poverty measures, in the spirit of Mehran (1976) for inequality indices and
Yaari (1988) for social welfare indices. From equations (6) and (17), note
that
S(v) =
Z
1
0
k(p; v)(p HI)dp+
Z
1
0
k(p; v)(p  L(p))dp (19)
and that S(v) has therefore a nice graphical interpretation in Figure 2 as the
sum of the weighted area of absolute deprivation and of the weighted area
showing inequality in censored incomes. By equations (9), (15) and (19),
we also obtain the immediate result that the S(v) index is a sum of expected
absolute and relative deprivation in the distribution of censored incomes :
S(v) =
Z
1
0
k(p; v)p HIdp+ I(v) (20)
= HI
|{z}
A
+
1
v
Z
1
0
k(p; v)c(p)dp
| {z }
B
(21)
where
A  average absolute deprivation (average shortfall from the poverty line)
B  average relative deprivation (weighted sum of c(p)).
7The link between S(v) and the s-Gini indices of inequality is briefly mentioned in Chakravarty
(1983, p.81). For other references to that class of poverty indices, see Hagenaars (1987) and
Shorrocks (1998).
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The S(v) indices are thus an ethically weighted sum of absolute and rela-
tive deprivation. Absolute deprivation is the average shortfall (HI) from the
poverty line. Relative deprivation is the ethically weighted average shortfall
from the incomes of others. Note that these comparison incomes are cen-
sored at the poverty line. This censoring of reference incomes at the poverty
line can be justified by the view of Runciman (1966, p.29) that “people of-
ten choose reference groups closer to their actual circumstances than those
which might be forced on them if their opportunities were better than they
are”. With that view, we may think of the poor as referring to the rich as not
being in poverty, and thus to their incomes as not being below the poverty
line, that is, as being equal to z. This avoids comparisons of the poor with
some potentially very large incomes, which the poor may consider as irrele-
vant to establishing their relative deprivation as poor persons.
As noted above, the concept of relative deprivation is linked to the cur-
rent widespread concern for social exclusion, which, as Silver (1994, p.557)
remarks, entails “the drawing of inappropriate group distinctions between
free and equal individuals which deny access to or participation in exchange
or interaction”, including participation in the socially perceived minimum
consumption level. When v = 1, no account is taken of relative depriva-
tion in the computation of the poverty index. The higher the value of v, the
more important is relative deprivation in assessing poverty, and the more im-
portant is the relative deprivation of the most excluded in assessing overall
relative deprivation.
v can then be usefully seen as an “exclusion-aversion” sensitivity param-
eter. S(v) itself can be interpreted as a money-metric per capita normative
cost of poverty, just as I(v) can be seen as the mean-normalised per capita
normative cost of inequality (see Atkinson (1970) and Sen (1973)). Since
R
1
0
!(p; v) = 1, it is indeed clear from (18) that a value of S(v) for our
poverty index can be thought of as being ethically equivalent to a situation
in which all have a poverty gap equal to S(v):
Z
1
0
!(p; v)S(v)dp  S(v): (22)
S(v) can thus be thought as the equally distributed equivalent (EDE) poverty
gap that is assessed by an analyst when using a particular value of v. When
v = 2, this EDE poverty gap reduces to the Thon(1979)- Chakravarty(1983)-
Shorrocks(1995) index (itself much influenced by Sen’s (1976) seminal in-
dex), which has been used for instance recently by Osberg and Xu (2000)
and Myles and Picot (2000) to decompose changes in the S(2) poverty index
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into changes in the average poverty gap and changes in the (standard Gini)
inequality in censored incomes.
3.2 Poverty and growth
Poverty assessments and poverty profiles are often made to guide public
policy analysis. We might thus wish to know by how much the S(v) indices
of poverty would fall if all incomes rose by one dollar (following, say, a
uniform fall in a poll tax or an increase in a lump-sum transfer), or if all
incomes increased by the same proportion (following, say, a surge in some
inequality-neutral economic growth). These changes in poverty can in par-
ticular guide the design of subsidies or transfer targetting, in the manner of
Besley and Kanbur (1988) for instance. For this purpose, we define S
0
(v)
as the S(v) index when all of the poor in a distribution are assumed to have
zero incomes. It is possible to show that S
0
(v) = z [1  (1 H)
v
]. For a
uniform per capita marginal income change, d, we then find that
dS(v)
d
= (1 H)
v
  1 =  
S
0
(v)
z
: (23)
Equation (23) is straightforward to compute since it only requires the head-
count, the poverty line and the ethical parameter v. The greater the focus on
the poorest (when v is large), the greater the change in deprivation since the
increase in  is then deemed to be more effective. The increase in income
for those above the poverty line has indeed no effect on deprivation, absolute
or relative, and this is seen as wasted when relative deprivation and ethical
focus on the poorest are given little weight in assessing poverty.
For a proportional marginal change d of all incomes, we find that:
dS(v)
d
= S(v)  S
0
(v): (24)
whose computation again only requires knowledge of v, the headcount and
the pre-change poverty index. Hence, a 1% inequality-preserving increase in
GNP reduces poverty most when “maximum poverty” S
0
(v) is large com-
pared to S(v). This corresponds to a situation where the poor are many
but absolutely and relatively little deprived, namely, to a situation where
inequality is not too strong an impediment to poverty alleviation through
equiproportional economic growth (on this, see for instance the recent pa-
pers by Ravallion (1997) and De Janvry and Sadoulet (2000)).
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3.3 Subgroup decomposition
Although the S(v) indices have a nice graphical interpretation and have
been shown to be a sum of absolute and relative deprivation, they are not
subgroup decomposable in the sense of Foster and Shorrocks (1991), since
they cannot be expressed as a sum of poverty indices defined separably over
exclusive and exhaustive subgroups. Since S(v) can be expressed as an in-
tegral of weighted incomes, we will see, however, that it is straightforward
to decompose overall poverty as a sum of subgroup contributions, with the
contributions involving individual weights that depend on the rank of indi-
viduals in the overall distribution of income. It is this dependence on ranks
in the overall distribution that makes the S(v) indices not decomposable in
the sense indicated above.
The property of separability is not, however, as desirable as is sometimes
suggested in the literature. It is unlikely for instance that in comparing them-
selves with others, individuals confine themselves to tight socio-economic
groups. Instead, if concerns of relativity ought to scan the whole distribution
of income to be relevant for the measurement of poverty, then separability
is clearly not a desirable property for a poverty index. Hence, we would not
wish a change in the distribution of incomes in a group to leave poverty un-
altered in another group if assessments of relative deprivation must be made
taking into account the whole population, and not a single subgroup. Or,
to paraphase Sen (1973, p.41), ”if one feels that the social valuation of the
welfare of individuals should depend crucially on the levels of welfare (or
incomes) of others, this property of the independence of each person’s wel-
fare component from the position of others [in other subgroups] has to be
sacrificed.”
To see how to decompose S(v) into subgroup components, denote by M
the number of subgroups, define as 
m
(p) the density of being a member
of group m at population percentile p, with
P
M
m=1

m
(p) = 1, and define
G
m
(p) as
G
m
(p) =
1

m
Z
p
0

m
(s)g(s)ds (25)
where 
m
=
R
1
0

m
(p)dp is the proportion of group m members in the
population. G
m
(p) thus cumulates the poverty gaps of members of group m
up to population rank p. We then have that
G(p) =
M
X
m=1

m
(p)G
m
(p): (26)
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Defining the poverty index S
m
(v) for group m as
S
m
(v) =
Z
1
0
k(p; v)G
m
(p)dp (27)
we easily find that :
S(v) =
M
X
m=1

m
S
m
(v):
3.4 Comparison of the properties of the S(v) indices
with those of additive indices
The Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984) class of poverty indices has become
in the last two decades the most popular class of poverty indices used in
theoretical and empirical studies of poverty. The FGT indices are defined
as:
FGT () =
Z
1
0
g(p)

dp (28)
where  is a non-negative parameter of ethical aversion to “inequality in
poverty gaps”. FGT ( = 0) gives the headcount index. FGT ( = 1) is
the average poverty gap (that is, HI or S(v = 1)). For larger values of ,
the FGT index is an average of some power of the poverty gaps. The larger
the value of , the greater the ethical weight given to larger poverty gaps in
measuring and comparing poverty.
The perceived and oft-mentioned advantages of the FGT class of indices
are its ethical flexibility (captured by the parameter ), its decomposability
across subgroups8, and its simplicity of computation and understanding. Al-
though we are not presumptuous enough (!) to believe that this paper will
(or in fact should) alter this popularity, we believe that the properties of the
S(v) indices compare rather well with those of the FGT additive indices.
We review and compare some of these properties now.
1) The S(v) indices are not subgroup-decomposable. As argued above in
Section 3.3, decomposability across subgroups is, however, not nec-
essarily a desirable property. This argument is reminiscent of the per-
ceived desirability/undesirability of subgroup decomposability in the
8Note that other decomposable indices include the Clark, Hemming and Ulph (1981),
Chakravarty (1983), and Watts (1968) indices.
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literature on inequality measurement, reflected for instance in the de-
bate between the proponents of the classes of generalised entropy in-
dices and of linear indices of inequality (including the Gini). Section
3.3 nevertheless suggested how we may show graphically the contribu-
tion of different subgroups to the cumulative poverty gap curveG(p) at
various values of p, and thus how some decomposition of total poverty
across subgroups could be obtained mainly for illustrative purposes.
2) One of the frequent complaints made about the Gini index until the
work of Donaldson and Weymark (1980, 1983) and Yitzhaki (1983)
was its ethical rigidity. Building on that latter work, the single-parametrisation
of the class S(v) of poverty indices makes it as ethically flexible as the
class of FGT indices. For both the FGT and the S(v) indices, this flex-
ibility allows the analyst to incorporate in poverty comparisons greater
or lesser weight to inequality in well-being. For the S(v) indices, eth-
ical flexibility has the particular advantage of being interpretable as
flexibility on the weight granted to individual relative deprivation in
assessing total deprivation, and more particularly on the weight given
to the relative deprivation of the most deprived.
3) S(v) is easily interpreted as a weighted average of poverty gaps in a
distribution of well-being. As indicated above in Section 3.1, it is also
the equally distributed poverty gap that is socially equivalent to the
actual distribution of poverty gaps. Whatever the value of v, S(v) is
thus money-metric, and is also easily interpreted as the socially repre-
sentative deprivation in a population, a feature which is not shared by
the FGT indices for  different from 19.
4) Since the CPG curve was shown in earlier work to have a nice role in
testing poverty dominance (apart from having nice graphical features
in itself), its use in poverty analysis is certain to become important in
the future. This makes the use of S(v) attractive, since it has a nice
geometric interpretation in terms of a weighted area underneath the
CPG curve. This interpretation holds for any value of v. Furthermore,
the inequality component for the S(v) indices has a nice conceptual
and graphical interpretation in terms of a sum of individual relative
deprivation along the p values.
9A money-metric index that is ordinally equivalent to the FGT index can be obtained simply
by using (FGT ())1=, but this transformation of the FGT indices would cost them their popular
additivity property.
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4 An illustration using LIS data
To illustrate some of the above relations, we use data drawn from the Luxem-
bourg Income Study (LIS)10 data sets of Belgium and Denmark (1992 data)
and of Italy and the USA (1991 data). These two pairs of countries were
partly selected because of the interesting features they exhibit in poverty
comparisons, as will become clearer later. The raw data were treated in the
same manner as in Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997), and yielded household
disposable income (i.e., post-tax-and-transfer income) expressed in 1991
adult-equivalent $ US 11. The reference poverty line was set at $7000 in
1991 adult-equivalent US dollars, which appeared to be a reasonable base-
line for poverty comparisons across industrialised countries, and which is
also approximately the 1991 American poverty line for single individuals.
12 Finally, since the results here are purely illustrative, we do not present
here standard errors for our various estimates (they can be ontained from the
authors upon request), although it will be clear from inspection that some of
the cross-country comparisons discussed below are not statistically signifi-
cant13.
Table 1 shows the headcounts for the 4 countries mentioned above at
poverty lines of US$7000 and slightly above. Italy has by far the most
poverty by this standard, followed by the United States, Belgium and Den-
mark. The first column of Table 2 shows the S(1) values for the same coun-
tries at z = $7000, which is simply the average poverty gap HI . Unlike
the poverty headcounts, the average poverty gaps (and thus absolute depri-
vation) are very similar in Belgium and in Denmark, and in Italy and in the
USA respectively. It will thus be interesting to check if relative deprivation is
10See http://lissy.ceps.lu for detailed information on the structure of these data.
11We apply purchasing power parities drawn from the Penn World Tables (see Summers
and Heston (1991) for the methodology underlying the computation of these parities, and
http://www.nber.org/pwt56.html for access to the 1991 figures) to convert national currencies into
1991 US dollars. As in Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997), we divide household income by an adult-
equivalence scale defined as h0:5, where h is household size, so as to allow comparisons of the
welfare of individuals living in households of different sizes. Hence, all incomes are transformed
into 1991 adult-equivalent $US. All household observations are also weighted by the LIS sample
weights “hweight” times the number of persons in the household. Finally, negative incomes are
set to 0.
12This poverty line is precisely equal to US$7086. We thank Buhong Zheng for this information.
13The standard errors can be computed from the results of Theorem 4 in Davidson and Duclos
(2000), which shows the asymptotic sampling distribution of CPG curves. These formulae and
others have been programmed by Duclos, Araar and Fortin (2000) in the software DAD (Distribu-
tive Analysis/Analyse distributive) which is freely available at www.mimap.ecn.ulaval.ca.
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sufficiently different across these countries to affect cross-country compar-
isons. Figure 3 shows how individual relative deprivations c(p) vary across
different quantiles p for each of the four countries. The United States show
more relative deprivation than Belgium and Denmark whatever the quantiles
considered. The Italian relative deprivation profile crosses that of the four
other countries. This also says that although mean absolute deprivation is
substantially greater in Italy than in Denmark or in Belgium, for individuals
towards the bottom of the income distributions, relative deprivation does not
differ by much (and can in fact be greater in Denmark than in Italy). The
c(p) curve for Italy crosses that of the US at around p = 0:09; looking at
equation (15), comparisons of the inequality in poverty gaps across Italy and
the United States can thus be expected to be ambiguous and to depend on
the ethical parameter v.
Before aggregating absolute and relative deprivation, it is useful to con-
sider the CPG curves for the four countries. Figure 4 does this. Multiple
crossings of the CPG curves occur, and only one unambiguous sample or-
dering can be made in the 6 possible comparisons of countries (for inference
of population orderings, we would need to take into account sampling vari-
ability). Since the sample CPG curve for Denmark is everywhere below that
for the US, it is possible to say that poverty is unambiguously greater for
the US sample than for Denmark for all of the poverty indices  2  dis-
cussed in (4). The CPG curve for Belgium crosses twice the CPG curve of
Denmark, and the Italian CPG curve crosses the US curve from below at the
very end.
One way to assess the ethical sensitivity of the poverty comparisons is
to compute the S(v) indices for various values of the ethical parameter v.
This is shown in Table 2, with aggregate relative deprivation indicated in
parentheses. For v equal to 2,3 and 4, poverty is lower in Belgium than in
Denmark, Italy or the United States, and Danish poverty is lower than in
Italy and the United States (as was expected from the ranking of the CPG
curves). The comparisons of Italian and American poverty depend on v and
thus on the importance given to relative deprivation in measuring poverty.
For the headcount and for absolute deprivation, Italy has more poverty than
the US, but when sufficient weight is given to relative deprivation (for v  2
for instance), poverty in the US becomes significantly greater.
Figures 5 and 6 show graphically how the indices change with variations
in v and marginal changes in z. Figure 5 confirms that at a poverty line of
$7000, Denmark always has more poverty than Belgium, whatever the value
of v, since it has both more absolute deprivation and generally more indi-
vidual relative deprivation whatever the percentile considered (recall Figure
15
3). When the poverty line increases up to $7500, however, Belgium starts
to have higher absolute deprivation, and it is then only with suitably high
weights on the relative deprivation of the poor that Belgian poverty can still
be considered lower than the Danish one. Similar remarks apply to the com-
parison of poverty between Italy and the US in Figure 6. For z  $7000,
Italian poverty can be considered greater than American poverty only when
sufficiently low weight is given to the importance of relative deprivation in
measuring poverty. Otherwise, Italy has less poverty than the US.
Finally, Table 3 shows how poverty in the four countries responds either
to a $1 increase

dS(v)
d

or to an equiproportionate increase

dS(v)
d

in ev-
eryone’s income. As equations (23) and (24) show, these responses depend
on the importance v given to concerns of relative deprivation, on the popula-
tion proportion of the poor and on whether the poor are in deep or in shallow
deprivation. The greater the focus on relative deprivation, the more sensitive
the S(v) indices are to equal absolute changes in incomes; the more numer-
ous the poor, the greater the sensitivity of the S(v) indices to equal absolute
changes in incomes; and the deeper the absolute and relative deprivation of
the poor, the less responsive are the S(v) indices to equal equiproportionate
changes in everyone’s incomes.
As expected, we find in Table 3 that increases in v and in the focus
granted to relative deprivation increase the reaction of poverty to absolute
and equiproportional growth in incomes. For instance, a $1 increase in ev-
eryone’s income in Belgium will decrease v(1) by 0.092, but will bring v(4)
down by 0.320. Table 3 also shows that although Table 2 reports numerically
close S(v) indices for Belgium and Denmark and for Italy and the United
States, the reaction of these indices to changes in incomes are very different.
Since Belgium has more poor than Denmark, its poverty indices react much
more strongly to equal increases of $1, and so does Italy when compared to
the United States. As for a 1% growth in everyone’s income, it is estimated
to bring poverty down much faster in Belgium than in Denmark, and almost
twice as quickly for Italy as for the United States. Because the S(v) indices
(including v(1), the average poverty gap) are close within these two pairs
of countries, these important differences are explained by the depth and the
concentration of the relative deprivation experienced by the poor. Depriva-
tion in the US is concentrated on a smaller proportion of the population than
in Italy (see Figure 3); it is thus also more deeply and more relatively felt by
the poorest. This makes inter alia inequality-neutral economic growth much
less effective in the United States than in Italy as an instrument of poverty
reduction.
16
5 Conclusion
Our paper develops the link between poverty and inequality by focussing
on a class of poverty indices which aggregate concerns of absolute depriva-
tion and relative deprivation. The indices depend upon an ethical parameter
v which captures the ethical sensitivity of poverty measurement to “exclu-
sion” or “relative-deprivation” aversion. We show that the indices equal the
sum of mean absolute deprivation and of an ethically weighted mean of the
individual relative deprivation found among the poor. The greater the value
of v, the greater the weight assigned to relative deprivation as against ab-
solute deprivation in measuring and comparing poverty. We also show how
the indices can be easily used to assess the impact of growth on poverty,
and compare some of their properties to those of the popular class of FGT
indices.
Our illustrative section reports that, for a reasonable common poverty
line, the United States have more relative deprivation than Denmark and
Belgium whatever the percentiles considered. For comparisons of total de-
privation, however, it is not possible to order these countries robustly. Since
absolute deprivation is very similar in the four countries considered, poverty
comparisons across them will inevitably depend on the importance granted
to concerns over relative deprivation. The impact of growth on poverty is
also seen to depend on the presence of and on concerns over relative de-
privation: in pairwise comparisons of Italy and the US and of Belgium and
Denmark, poverty is much less responsive to growth in the USA and in Den-
mark, which is also where relative deprivation is generally found to be the
greatest.
6 Appendix
We show here the derivation of equations (11), (14) and (15). First note that
Z
p
0
k(s; v)ds =
Z
1
0
k(s; v)ds 
Z
1
p
k(s; v)ds (29)
= v   !(p; v) (30)
Integrating by parts I(v) (as defined by (9)) then yields:
I(v) =
Z
1
0
(p  L(p))k(p; v)dp
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= (v   !(p; v)) (p  L(p))j
1
0
 
Z
1
0
(v   !(p; v))

1 
y(p)


dp
=
Z
1
0
!(p; v)

1 
y(p)


dp; (31)
which is also equation (11). Equation (14) is obtained by noting that:
c(p
i
) =
Z
1
p
i
(y(p)  y(p
i
)) dp
=
Z
1
0
y(p)dp 
Z
p
i
0
y(p)dp  (1  p
i
)y(p
i
)
=  (1  L(p
i
))  (1  p
i
)y(p
i
): (32)
To show equation (15), first note from the above and from the definition
of k(p; v) that
1
v
Z
1
0
c(p)k(p; v)dp =
(v   1)
Z
1
0

(1  L(p))(1  p)
(v 2)
 
y(p)

(1  p)
v 1

dp: (33)
Integrating by parts y(p)

(1 p)
(v 1) by integrating y(p)= to yield L(p) and
differentiating (1  p)(v 1), we find:
1
v
Z
1
0
c(p)k(p; v)dp = 1 
Z
1
0
L(p)k(p; v)dp: (34)
Since
R
1
0
pk(p; v)dp = 1, (34) is the same as the definition of I(v) in equa-
tion (9).
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Table 1: Headcounts for different poverty lines
z H
BE
H
DK
H
IT
H
US
7000 0.09186 0.06965 0.20478 0.13738
7100 0.09601 0.074192 0.21038 0.14174
7200 0.09886 0.077878 0.21678 0.14565
7300 0.10702 0.081991 0.22384 0.14881
7400 0.10891 0.086221 0.23113 0.15187
7500 0.11756 0.090567 0.23781 0.15594
Table 2: S(v) and relative deprivation when z = US$7; 000
Country(year) S(1) S(2) S(3) S(4)
Belgium(92) 176.20 344.71 506.02 660.55
(0) (168.51) (329.82) (484.35)
Denmark(92) 181.12 355.80 524.32 686.94
(0) (174.68) (343.20) (505.82)
Italy(91) 350.35 661.79 939.85 1189.16
(0) (311.44) (589.50 (838.81)
Usa(91) 348.97 669.75 965.13 1237.60
(0) (320.78) (616.16) (888.63)
Table 3: dS(v)
d
and dS(v)
d
when z = US$7; 000
Country(year) v = 1 v = 2 v = 3 v = 4
Belgium(92) -0.092 -0.175 -0.251 -0.320
-466.79 -882.26 -1251.36 -1578.58
Denmark(92) -0.070 -0.134 -0.195 -0.251
-306.44 -585.39 -838.91 -1068.95
Italy(91) -0.205 -0.368 -0.497 -0.600
-1083.11 -1911.64 -2540.17 -3011.84
Usa(91) -0.137 -0.256 -0.358 -0.446
-612.68 -1121.44 -1541.64 -1886.45
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Figure 1: Cumulative Poverty Gap Curves
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Figure 2: Absolute deprivation and inequality of poverty
25
Figure 3: Relative Deprivation in Belgium, Denmark, Italy and the US (z =
$7000)
26
Figure 4: CPG curves for Belgium, Denmark, Italy and the US (z=$7000)
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Figure 5: Difference between the Belgian and the Danish S(v) indices for different
v and z
28
Figure 6: Differences between the Italian and the American S(v) indices for dif-
ferent v and z
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